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Should Districts and Regions elect their own Leaders in Ghana? 
 
 
Kwame Badu Antwi-Boasiako 




Decentralization, leadership accountability, and empowerment of local leaders in Ghana are 
the main focus of this analysis.  The paper discusses the complexities of decentralization and 
leadership responsibilities to effect changes toward a better path to socioeconomic 
development.  It examines the problem with the Ghana Constitution as it pertains to local 
government elections and advocates for a constitutional amendment to empower districts and 
regions to elect their own leaders so that local governments in each district can be efficient and 
accountable to the electorate. 
 





Decentralization is an essential component of democratic societies, which is widely being 
adopted in emerging democracies, especially in African countries, to make their administrative 
systems more efficient (Dillinger, 1994).  However, there is a large body of scholarly literature 
that provides conflicting effects of decentralization on effective public administration (Faguet, 
2008; Kim et al., 2005). In Ghana, politicians who advocate for decentralization are sometimes 
skeptical of giving or sharing power with their subordinates as the concept is not well 
understood. 
In fact, the literature on decentralization, according to constitutional law specialists, 
tries to avoid the problem of confining decentralization to “legal models of government 
relations” (Cohen & Peterson, 1999, 19). The authors define it along the principal distinction 
between unitary and federal based systems like federation, confederation, unions, and leagues. 
Decentralization, according to this school of thought, is a community having legally specified 
sovereignty over the identified public sector tasks in a well-defined territorial jurisdiction 
(Cohen & Peterson, 1999, 19-22).  Ghana’s political structure falls into the unitary political 
category, where the executive holds the power of nominating district and regional leaders.  
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Hence, the governed in these units have no choice but to live with the selection of the 
executive. 
Since the Fourth Republic of Ghana (1992-present), despite the accusations of electoral 
frauds by the two leading political parties (New Patriotic Party [NPP] and National Democratic 
Congress [NDC]) in the country, Ghana has enjoyed four successful general elections.  This 
feat, undeniably, makes Ghana a more politically and economically stable country compared to 
some of its neighbors over the same period (Callmachi, 2008).  The irony of Ghana’s political 
system is that notwithstanding the form of government the country is—military or 
democratic—the role of the executive remains the same regarding the appointments of the 
heads of local governments.  This practice, arguably, provides little or no local power to the 
grassroots.  It, therefore, minimizes the otherwise political difference between a military and 
democratic regime. 
This analysis advocates for a constitutional amendment to allow local government 
empowerment for the districts and regions in Ghana to elect their own leaders. It maintains that 
by continuing the current process where regional and district administrators are appointed by 
the central government, the locals are deprived of the opportunity to elect leaders of their 
choice.  Additionally, this argument “stems largely from the ideal that decentralization will 
promote better governance as local officials are supposedly more aware of, and more 
responsive to, local needs” (Ducan, 2007, 713). Decentralization, as has been argued by 
proponents, is more likely to encourage and promote not only democracy but also provides 
locals with the chance to have control over their own governance. 
The article is organized into five main sections:  First it provides an overview of 
theoretical considerations underlying the argument for decentralization followed by a brief 
history of Ghana’s political system.  It then addresses the issues of effective leadership and 
decentralization, and finally, it makes a case for electing district and regional leaders by the 
various electoral constituencies: Districts and Regions. The paper concludes with 





As a panacea to ease regional conflicts (Laksono & Topatimasang, 2003; Permana, 2002), 
“decentralization is a process where central government transfers political, fiscal, and 
administrative powers to lower levels in an administrative and territorial hierarchy” (Duncan, 
2007, 713).  In theory, it holds regional leaders accountable to their constituents instead of the 
central government.  Decentralization is defined in a variety of ways by the degree of 
delegation and autonomy of local actors (Assibey-Mensah, 2000; Fesler, 1965; Werlin, 2003), 
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which presents conflicts and dilemmas in the concept and its impact (Faguet, 1997; Hommes, 
1995).  Empirical literature does not agree on the benefits of decentralization as different 
studies are poles apart in their conclusions. For example, while Olowu and Wunsch (1990), 
Putnam (1993), and World Bank (1994) argue that decentralization makes governments more 
responsive, Faguet (2008), Tanzi (1995), Prud’homme (1995), and Samoff (1990) think 
otherwise.  However, the 1992 constitutional recognition for decentralization has renewed 
interest in political decentralization in Ghana, as locals often reject leaders appointed by the 
central government (Ayisi, 2008). 
While economists focus on efficiency and equity, public administration scholars are 
also interested in the distribution of power, responsiveness, transparency, and accountability 
(Klingner & Nalbandian, 1998).  The literature affirms that macroeconomic function must 
remain with the central government, suggesting that local governments must deal with program 
specificities for local demand.  Oates (1993) analysis of over 50 countries confirmed a positive 
relationship between decentralization and economic growth. 
The theoretical argument for fiscal decentralization dates back to Madison, and 




 centuries (Wolman, 1990), though they had different reasons for 
supporting decentralization.  For example, in the Federalist Papers No. 39 (FP39), Madison 
argues that leaders must derived their powers “directly… from the great body of the people,” 
which means that powerful locals and “not inconsiderable…handful of …nobles exercising 
their oppression by a delegation of their powers” (Rossiter, 1961; 241).  Though 
decentralization is not specifically mentioned in FP39, Madison believes that the people must 
be given the mandate to elect their leaders as a way of “composing the distinct and 
independent” regions, to “which they respectively belong” (Rossiter, 1961, 243). 
Rousseau (1762) also favored small government.  To him, “rulers over burdened with 
business, see nothing for themselves: clerks govern” (1762, 59-50).  Using the Poland political 
system, Rousseau, who advocated for a political reformation, instructed the Poles to perfect and 
extend the authority of their provincial parliaments to avoid the dangers of larger state 
bureaucracies (Rousseau, 1772, 183-184).  By this assertion, Rousseau was insisting on the 
essentials of local representation: decentralization.  According to Wolman (1990), small 
democratic (local) governments were the fundamental hopes of the people, as most of them 
distrusted the activities of the central government.  The debate for political decentralization is 
inconclusive in the literature as both proponents and opponents provide different findings in 
their studies (see for example, Putnam, 1993; Prud’homme, 1995). 
In discussing the politics of decentralization, therefore, it should be noted that the 
concept goes together with centralized government -power. Though decentralization is 
primarily a strategy for transferring authority and responsibility from the central government to 
sub-national (regional and district) levels of government (Ostrom, 1989 and Stone, 1997), many 
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African leaders only adopt the concept in theory but fail to delegate powers to the districts and 
regions. Some studies maintain that the concept is not easily defined; therefore, it has several 
dimensions and a wide variety of types of institutional restructuring, which encompasses the 
term decentralization. Though some scholars see it as a simple term, they argue that its 
simplistic generalization is sometimes too broad.  According to Fesler (1965) decentralization is 
a term of rich conceptual and empirical meaning “which can designate static fact and dynamic 
process and it can refer to pure ideal-type and to moderate incremental change” (536) when the 
rational theory of decentralization is understood in all compartments. 
 
 
Types of Decentralization 
 
For the purpose of this paper, a four-stage (political decentralization, deconcentration, 
devolution, and delegation) definition is provided based on the degree of discretion and 
responsibility delegated by the central executive.  The literature shows that developing 
countries have addressed decentralization in different ways, often reflecting the national 
history, politics, and culture for administrative and economic efficiency; but more important is 
the role of district and regional leaders in focusing on the needs of their constituencies. 
However, the concept of the decentralization/development dichotomy has not yielded the 
desired results in other parts of the world (Kettl, 2000), including Ghana.  This analysis defines 
decentralization as an electoral devolution to enable citizens at the grassroots (i.e., locals) to 
elect their own leaders void of any direct input from the central government. 
 
Political Decentralization 
Political decentralization, which is manifested in the degree and types of political autonomy 
and accountability, is of greater importance to this study. A fully developed system of political 
decentralization in Ghana is a situation where local people in the districts and regions elect their 
own legislative and executive personnel so that those units will be able to hire, pay, and dismiss 
administrative personnel without reference to central authority. 
Political decentralization gives citizens and their elected representatives the political 
power in the public policy process. This form of decentralization is associated with pluralistic 
politics and representative government, but it can also support democratization by giving 
citizens, or their representatives, more influence in the formulation and implementation of 
policies (Furniss, 1974; Harrigan, 1994) in their areas.  Political decentralization often requires 
constitutional or statutory reforms. Such a reform may force elected officials in the 
constituencies to be more accountable to the electorates instead of satisfying the wishes of a 
distant executive.  Administratively, political decentralization empowers citizens to “play a 
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larger role in regional governance… [including] conflict resolution” (Duncan, 2007, 727).  This 
empowerment, unfortunately, is lacking in the current political process where the executive has 
the exclusive power to appoint district and regional leaders.  The literature affirms that 
“political appointees are subject to the whims” (Klingner and Nalbandian, 1998, 43) of the 
central government. 
Generally empirical studies tend to favor political decentralization over centralization 
in terms of innovation, leadership accountability, and responsiveness (Taylor, 2003).  This 
assertion, according to Taylor, has “become a sort of accepted wisdom among social scientists” 
(231).  Nevertheless, given the theoretical support by social scientists, a general correlation 
between political decentralization and innovation is yet to be firmly established.  Treisman 
(2007) argues that self-governing is the core aspect of modern democratic nations where the 
people must elect their own leaders.  To Treisman, political decentralization is good for its 
facilitating features. These features include but are not limited to administrative efficiency, 
checks on central government abuses, and policy experimentation.  While decentralization 
satisfies geographically concentrated ethnic groups, it could also prompt locally elected 
officials to be unsupportive to central government by “play[ing] the ethnic card” (15) to distort 
fiscal distribution.  Political decentralization oftentimes leads to deconcentration. 
 
Deconcentration 
Deconcentration is a form of network of central power and sub-state institutions comprising the 
elites of those constituencies.  As Assibey Mensah (2000) puts it, deconcentration is a power 
sharing strategy where power is transferred from central operating agencies to regional ones.  
The central government under such a concept uses the local governments to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness of delivering services (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983, 79-81).   Rondinelli 
(1981) argue that deconcentration takes place as long as central government disperses certain 
responsibilities of services to regional and local governments. 
 
Devolution 
Another division of decentralization is devolution. The theory behind this stipulates that 
constituencies must operate independent of the central government.  The central authority does 
not exercise any authority, and the regions are left alone in their operations.  It is the transfer of 
service responsibility from central government to autonomous units of local government with 
some corporate status.  Devolution is a radical political concept, which involves the creation of 
independent units at the sub-national level. These autonomous entities function on their own 
accord to signify separation from the central authority. 
For example, Conyers (1984) argues that devolution is the legal establishment of 
locally democratically elected political authorities, but other scholars (Prud’homme, 1995 and 
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Samoff, 1990) do question the viable policy process for development. Conyers is more likely to 
argue that poor districts and regions in Ghana, for example, may not benefit from the central 
government assistance  if decentralization is adopted,  making these areas less likely to develop.  
According to Cohen and Peterson (1991), the concept represents separateness of structure 
within a political system. But Esman and Uphoff (1984) argue that devolution and 
decentralization are two different issues, which should not be discussed together for any 
comparison. They argued that decentralization has relations to a central authority but devolution 
is a unit of its own and not accountable to any authority. 
This concept of decentralization describes an intra-organizational pattern of power 
relationships and should be seen as such.  Esman and Uphoff (1984) contend that the 
institutional separation from other levels of the government only succeeds in rendering the local 
levels impotent. For example, the poor districts in the northern part of Ghana cannot raise 
enough revenue for development since there are neither significant industries nor businesses to 
provide employment in these districts. There are various interpretations of devolution in 
relation to development in the literature; Uwadibie (2000, 58), for example, maintains that local 
autonomy “does not create incentives for development [but] only creates a network of 
organizations to promote development...by the central authority.” 
Kincaid (1998) describes devolution as a revolution, which must make state and local 
governments more efficient and effective in service delivery. He identifies the objectives of 
devolution to include 1) More efficient provision and production of public services; 2) better 
alignment of the cost and benefits of government for a diverse citizenry; 3) better fits between 
public goods and their spatial characteristics; 4) increased competition, experimentation, and 
innovation in the public sector; 5) greater responsiveness to citizen preferences; and 6) more 
transparent accountability in policymaking. Kincaid argues that these are ambitious objectives 
with no apparent direction but they occur in the context of vertical intergovernmental relations 
with some constitutional changes. In countries where devolution has been used, the central 
government still retains some authority.  In Ghana, regardless of which type of decentralization 
the central government adopts, the executive will still maintain control over the districts and 
regions because of the dire financial conditions of some of the districts. 
 
Delegation 
The final form of decentralization discussed in this paper is delegation, which seeks to transfer 
service responsibility from central government agencies to specialized organizations with some 
degree of operating autonomy (Ayee, 2000).  Apart from devolution, which is expected to stand 
on its own, the other forms of decentralization discussed above tend to overlap in the execution 
of responsibilities between the centralized authority and district or regional representatives. The 
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theory of decentralization obviously presents a problem for a country with a unitary political 
system like Ghana because of the system’s political and legal structures. 
The NPP under John Agyekum Kufuor’s presidency, like its predecessor, Jerry J. 
Rawlings, promoted the decentralization concept as one of its administrative goals, but how an 
administration would choose one strategy over another remains a matter of preference and 
interest of that administration.  Though the Ghana Constitution provides the structure of 
decentralization in Ghana (see Ghana Constitution: Chapter 20: Article 240, A-E), it does not 
allow citizens at the grassroots to elect their political leaders.  For example, Article 243 (1) 
states that regional and district political leaders “shall be appointed by the President.”  
Undeniably, democratic deficits are associated with the ongoing decentralization reforms in 
Ghana.  One could argue that decentralization has not succeeded since it does not appear to 
adopt the characteristics discussed in the literature.  The concept of political decentralization in 
Ghana has negative implications to the executive since some districts have over the years 




Brief Background of Decentralization in Ghana 
 
A discussion of the complexities facing Ghanaian political leadership including the Kufuor 
administration regarding decentralization is beyond the scope of this analysis.  However, some 
understanding of the concept from a historical background may help to explain the quandary of 
the executive.    The literature on this topic considers the colonial British indirect rule through 
the local chiefs as the genesis of decentralization in the then Gold Coast (now Ghana).  
Decentralization thus became a political tool for the British through the chiefs and their elders 
to reinforce the wishes of the British government.  As Bamfo (2000) noted those chiefs who 
cooperated with the British were rewarded and the uncooperative ones were punished. Such an 
authoritative implementation of the concept created fear among the chiefs and their subjects 
(i.e., the locals). 
Ghana’s political independence in March of 1957 did little to change the political 
structures established by the colonizers. As a result, many studies have described post-colonial 
decentralization as ineffective, as regime change through military coups became the order of the 
day after Kwame Nkrumah was ousted in 1966.  It was during the mid-1970s under Lt. Col. 
Ignatius Kutu Acheampong’s military regime when the government tried to empower the locals 
(Nkrumah, 2000).  The history of contemporary decentralization in spite of Acheampong’s 
attempt is credited to the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) regime under Jerry 
John Rawlings’ administration (Assibey-Mensah, 2000).  Assibey-Mensah argues that after the 
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passage of the 1987 Local Government Law (PNDC Law 207), “110 District Councils and their 
respective District Assemblies (DAs) were set up” (2000, 17) to ensure local participation in the 
decision making process.  This led to the formation of the defunct People’s Defense 
Committees (PDCs) in communities to identify each area’s needs instead of relying on the 
central government to make every decision and try to solve local problems from the Castle 
(Office of the National Government).  Research shows that the PDC concept created grassroots 
interest in local administration as district elections during the PNDC regime were the highest 
ever recorded for the decades in the late 1980s. Assibey-Mensah also noted that “official 
reports indicated that 58.9 percent of registered Ghanaian voters cast their ballots in the local 
elections, and the turnout was the highest of any district-level election over the past 30 years” 
(2000, 17). 
The PDCs, made up of local self-identified defenders of the PNDC revolution, 
effectively took over local government responsibilities, though they were often limited to 
mobilizing the implementation of local self-help projects, while the deconcentrated ministries 
played a more significant role. Ayee (1994) notes that despite the PNDC’s rhetoric, its interest 
in decentralization reflected that of previous regimes, thus, a curiosity in the administrative 
decentralization of central government and not the devolution of political authority to the local 
level.  Additionally, Ayee (2000) perceives a key feature of local governance, through the 
PDCs for example, in the pre-1988 period as a dual hierarchical structure in which central and 
local government institutions operated in parallel, but with encroachment at times by better-
resourced central government on the roles and responsibilities of under-resourced local 
revolutionary activists (Ayee, 2000, 49-50).  The PDC concept of decentralization became a 
legitimate revolutionary political institution under the PNDC military administration.  Was 
there any legal or constitutional backing to decentralization in Ghana? 
 
 
The Politics of Decentralization in Ghana since the 1990s 
 
The military administration of Rawlings planned to transfer both fiscal and some political 
responsibilities from Accra (National Capital) to all the districts and municipalities in the 
country.  This move centered on local government law decreed under the PNDC administration.  
It was to introduce fiscal balance between the central government and the districts.  By 
transferring power to the districts, the PNDC administration was making government more 
responsive to local communities to placate critics of the centralized military rule. For example, 
according to Adedeji (2001) Ghanaians were not happy with Rawlings’ PNDC administration 
during the late 1980s. He states that “objections to the authoritarianism of Rawlings 
8
African Social Science Review, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol4/iss1/3
Administrative Decentralization: Should Districts 
and Regions elect their own Leaders in Ghana? 
 
43 
government, which lacked structure for grassroots participation, were widespread despite 
rhetoric to the contrary by the PNDC” (1).  
The PNDC government introduced a legislative reform, the Local Government Law 
(LGL) (PNDC Law 207) in 1988, which led to the creation of  110 designated districts within 
Ghana’s ten regions, with non-partisan District Assembly (DA) elections held for the first time 
in 1988/89 under the PNDC and subsequently every four years (1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006). 
The law provides in part that two-thirds of DA members are elected on an individual non-
partisan basis and one-third is appointed by the central government including a District Chief 
Executive (DCE) for each of the 110 districts. 
The 1988 LGL was to promote grassroots, citizen participation, and ownership of the 
machinery of government by devolving power, competence and means power at the district 
level. The PNDC decentralization exercise, through the PDCs, was to satisfy the demands of 
the revolution and was not in the interest of democratic principles. Ayee (2000) argues that the 
decentralization policy under the second Rawlings regime had self-serving motives. The 
PNDC’s decentralization policy was, therefore, seen by critics as an effort to increase the 
legitimacy of Rawlings’ second revolution, which ruled Ghana from 1982 through 1992. 
 
 
The Constitution and Decentralization 
 
After eleven years of dictatorship under Rawlings (1981-1991), the 1992 Ghana Constitution 
provided a transition from a military rule to multi-party democracy at the national level, which 
also authorized the 1988 LGL reforms. It consolidated the aim of decentralization within the 
overall context of a liberal democratic constitution, yet essential democratic elements remained 
compromised, especially through the retention of presidential appointments instead of local 
elections in the districts. The objective of decentralization was laid out specifically in the 1992 
Ghana Constitution (see chapter 20) under Decentralization and Local Government.  Here the 
Constitution states categorically in Article 240[1] that “Local government and administration 
[are to] be decentralized,” and that the “functions, powers, responsibilities and resources should 
be transferred from the Central Government [Castle] to local government” constituencies 
(Article 240[2]). 
The independent role of local government, with discretionary powers at the grassroots, was 
subjected to a provision in Article 240[2][b], which states that “measures should be taken to 
enhance the capacity of local government authorities to plan, initiate, co-ordinate, manage and 
execute policies in respect of matters affecting local people.” 
The principles of participation in local government and accountability to the 
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locals were also emphasized in Article 240[2][e], which states, “To ensure the accountability of 
local government authorities, people in particular local government areas shall, as far as 
practicable, be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their governance.”  There is 
a contradiction here.  For example, during the eras of the Rawlings and Kufour’s 
administrations the locals rejected their leaders, but the executive rejected the cry of citizens at 
the grassroots (locals) (Ghana News Agency, 2005). 
It is not uncommon for the central government to appoint someone the people have 
rejected in parliamentary elections to become the senior administrator in the same constituency.  
In 2005, several of such appointments were made and the trend did not change.  Critics argue 
that “in the first place, [such practice] amounts to undermining democracy, because these were 
people who were rejected by their own constituents at an election and the government is 
recycling them by using the 'back door' to now impose them on the people as their political 
heads”  (Ghana News Agency, 2005b).  Without a doubt, the democratic intent in the 
decentralization requirements are provided in Article 35[6][d]: The “state shall take appropriate 
measures by decentralizing the administrative and financial machinery of government to the 
regions and districts and by affording all possible opportunities to the people to participate in 
decision-making at every level of national life and in government.” 
The 1992 Ghana Constitution preserved some of the PNDC 1988 reforms of non-
partisan local level elections and presidential powers of appointment. A District Assembly  
shall comprised 70 percent elected members and 30 percent of the members appointed by the 
President “in consultation with traditional authorities and other interest groups in the district” 
(Article 242[d]). For example, the appointment of a district chief executive (DCE) by the 
President is retained with at least the approval of 66 percent of the DA members (Article 
243[1]). The DCE is the political head of the local executive, centrally involved in decision-
making, with a District Coordinating Director (DCD) as the highest ranking civil servant.   
The Ghana Constitution also provides guidelines for the local government on finances 
and clearly states that the DAs “should have sound financial bases with adequate and reliable 
sources of revenue” [Article 240(2)], with an attempt to secure this position through the 
establishment of the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). This is determined annually by 
the legislature but with appropriation “not less than five percent of the total revenues of Ghana” 
[Article 252(2)].  The proceeds of the DACF are divided between DAs on the basis of a 
revenue sharing formula approved by the legislative.  Article 240 provides reforms of the civil 
service with local government authority, which states “as far as practicable, the persons in the 
service of the local government shall be subject to effective control of local authorities” [2][d]).  
The irony of Article 240 is that it is focused extensively on the districts with no mention of the 
responsibilities of regional leaders.  For Ghana to benefit from the decentralization concept, it 
10
African Social Science Review, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol4/iss1/3
Administrative Decentralization: Should Districts 
and Regions elect their own Leaders in Ghana? 
 
45 
would largely depend on the vision of the leadership and a constitutional amendment to 
empower the electorates. 
 
 
Decentralization: Two Faces, One Coin 
 
Ghana’s political history lacks continuity. The road to Ghana’s independence was brutal and 
nasty as the British did not want to relinquish its power over the occupied colonies.  The 
military and democratic mix of Ghana’s political system since independence has given leaders 
cause to be cautious of how they share power at the regional and district levels.  Since the 
military ousted the Convention People’s Party (CPP) under Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in 1966, 
democratically elected leaders like Dr. K. A. Busia (1969-1972), Dr. Hilla Liman (1979-1981), 
Jerry J. Rawlings (1992-2000), and John A. Kufour (2001-2008) have always been suspicious 
of individuals who could influence the military in coup plots.  Busia and Liman became victims 
of military coups while the Kufour administration accused some individuals of plotting to 
overthrow his administration.  For example, several media reports quoted President Kufour as 
saying “that ex-President Rawlings was planning a coup to topple his government.” (Enquirer, 
2006)  How does this play into decentralization? Given the above discussion, leaders tend to 
delegate responsibilities and government duties to individuals who are loyal to a ruling party 
instead of allowing the grassroots to elect their own leaders to ensure security.  It could be 
argued that such appointments do not consider the interest of the citizens, who oftentimes reject 
the presidential appointees. 
On four different occasions (1966, 1972, 1979, and 1981), the Ghana Constitution was 
suspended as a result of military coups.  Such political instability has forced democratic leaders, 
it can be argued, to act like military leaders where the executive tends to hold on to power while 
the regional leaders become extensions of the executive branch without any significant power.  
Democratic and undemocratic changes of government in Ghana affect local political structures.  
For example, the fall of the Nkrumah’s CPP saw the collapse of the Young Pioneers (Youth 
Wings of the CPP), while the PDCs vanished with the defunct PNDC as a grassroot political 
structure.  Ghana’s political history shows that decentralization is a concept used by 
governments to reflect the leaders’ political ideologies as seen under the Nkrumah, Rawlings, 
and Kufuor administrations, but the actual implementation of the concept under any of these 
leaders is far from how the literature defines it.  Politically, whether civilian or military, the 
executive has always appointed favorites as political leaders in the regions and districts with 
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Elections: Making a case for DCE and Regional Ministers (RM). 
 
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) argue that local involvement in the political process through elections 
ensures self-empowerment as locals gain more political power.  Such empowerment translates 
to locals not only trusting their elected officials but also have a higher sense of political efficacy 
about local citizens’ issues (1990, 382-384).  Despite the mixed conclusions of the impact of 
decentralization, allowing districts and regions to elect their own public officials “makes 
government more accountable to the local populations” (Duncan, 2007, 711) and more 
responsive to local concerns.  It is against this background in the literature; the reason why this 
paper calls for districts and regional elections in Ghana. 
In any matured democracy, the people govern themselves or play a significant role in 
the governing process through elections.  The theory of modern representative democratic 
systems provides that the core of popular participation is voting, therefore, an elected candidate 
will represent the voice of the governed.  The gap created through legal and constitutional 
backing for not electing DCEs and RMs in Ghana has been highlighted in this paper.  The 
actual challenge is on government (Parliament) to realize this loophole in the Ghanaian 
Constitution by legally and procedurally amending it for voters in the districts to elect 
individuals of their choice.  A weak democratic constitution, one could argue, is better than the 
strongest authoritative decree since the former avails itself for amendments and not the latter. 
The 1992 Ghana Constitution came into being after over a decade of military rule.  It 
could, therefore, be argued that the absence of honest and prolonged discussion in the writing of 
this Constitution before its adoption may have represented the views of a few who belong to the 
military class with their authoritative ideology despite several years of constitutional assemble 
meetings.  Sixteen years into the Fourth Republic is considered young in the political literature. 
However, it seems to be the ripe time for any amendments if the Constitution would be able to 
stand the test of the years ahead as Ghana snails into a well established democracy. 
The government must devise new strategies for managing public programs as it 
critically evaluates policies regarding issues like health, education, the national economy, 
elections, and transportation.  With anticipated growth in the economy and other sectors, it is 
obvious that the central government may not be able to police every sector of the economy at 
large, especially in the regions; hence the importance of decentralization as discussed earlier in 
this paper.  Most government bureaucracies in Ghana remain structured and staffed to manage 
the traditional pre-independence political programs with the central government in control of 
every activity. 
As the country has undeniably accepted democracy as the way toward viable political 
and economic development, government strategies and tactics must also change, especially in 
its structures and processes in the area of human resource management.   Regrettably, such a 
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centralized bureaucratic structure as the executive appointment of leaders in the regions and 
districts has not changed significantly in line with democratic principles.  Although the district 
and regional leaders’ appointments by a president have constitutional backing, this paper 
advocates for a constitutional amendment to allow locals to elect their leaders instead of the 
central government.  Admittedly, since the 1990s Ghana has undergone a steady, but often 
unnoticed transformation in terms of its policies toward improved health care, education, 
transportation, and economic growth. However, in all these sectors, a decentralized 
management system could have provided a better sense of local ownership, which would have 
led to an improved maintenance of facilities and government assets as long as transparency and 
accountability on the part of the elected existed. 
Local citizens’ direct involvement in electing their leaders is more likely to improve 
government efficiency and responsiveness, which are likely to ensure regional accountability 
where the citizens will have the mandate to replace or retain their leaders through elections 
based on the leaders’ performance during their tenure.  The election of DA members and RMs 
could be scheduled the same date that the presidential and parliamentary election is held.    
Such a constitutional amendment is more likely to diminish the notion of the indirect one party 
system where the president appoints DCEs and RMs throughout the country and those 





The paper discussed four types of decentralization: political decentralization, deconcentration, 
devolution, and delegation.  It noted that the theory of decentralization seems appealing, but 
one cannot conclude which one Ghana utilizes as described in the Constitution.  In Ghana’s 
Fourth Republic, as in other African countries, most people, including the politicians, are in 
favor of decentralization as a positive method of citizen empowerment and local economic 
development. Decentralization enjoys both legal and constitutional guarantees with strong 
multi-partisan support. However, though some scholars argue that decentralization ensures 
responsibility, efficiency, and accountability through participatory democracy, Ghanaians at the 
regional and district levels are not involved in electing their own political leaders. Therefore the 
paper advocates for a constitutional amendment to allow locals to select their leaders. 
The post-independence history of decentralization in Ghana has come with criticisms as 
the executive tends to appoint only party loyalists: the spoils system concept.  Such executive 
power, as enshrined in the Constitution, does not ensure participatory democracy “unless the 
right, interest and involvement… [of]…society at large are taken into consideration [through] 
elections (Loh, 2008, 128).  Allowing locals to elect their own political leaders is more likely to 
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force local public officials to perform since failing to do so, may result in the electorates 
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